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Abstract. Risk is unavoidable in business and risk management is needed
amongst others to set up good security policies. Once the risks are eval-
uated, the next step is to decide how they should be treated. This in-
volves managers making decisions on proper countermeasures to be im-
plemented to mitigate the risks. The countermeasure expenditure, to-
gether with its ability to mitigate risks, is factors that affect the selection.
While many approaches have been proposed to perform risk analysis,
there has been less focus on delivering the prescriptive and specific infor-
mation that managers require to select cost-effective countermeasures.
This paper proposes a generic approach to integrate the cost assessment
into risk analysis to aid such decision making. The approach makes use
of a risk model which has been annotated with potential countermea-
sures, estimates for their cost and effect. A calculus is then employed to
reason about this model in order to support decision in terms of decision
diagrams. We exemplify the instantiation of the generic approach in the
CORAS method for security risk analysis.
1 Introduction
In order to treat risks, decision makers (or managers) have to make decisions
on proper countermeasures to be implemented to mitigate the risks. However,
investment decisions are complicated. An organization needs the best possible
information on risks and countermeasures to decide what is the best investment.
This involves deciding which countermeasure offers a good trade-off between
benefits and spending. The countermeasure expenditure, together with its ability
to mitigate risks, are factors that affect the selection. Inappropriate and over-
expensive countermeasures are money lost. Therefore, a systematic method that
helps to reduce business exposure while balancing countermeasure investment
against risks is needed. Such a method would thereby help answering questions
like “(1): How much is it appropriate to spend on countermeasures?” and “(2):
Where should spending be directed?” as highlighted by Birch and McEvoy [4].
Unfortunately, there exists little support for the prescriptive and specific
information that managers require to select cost-effective risk countermeasures.
Several cost estimation models have been proposed but most are only loosely
coupled to risk analysis. For example, the Security Attribute Evaluation Method
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Fig. 1. Steps of our process.
(SAEM) [7] is well-suited to evaluate risk reduction but is very vague on the
issue of cost effectiveness. Likewise, [1] suggests several methods to assess cost
of risks (e.g., Cost-Of-Illness, Willingness-To-Pay), but none of these methods
provides specific support to evaluate countermeasure expenditure. Chapman et
al. [8] propose a framework which justifies mitigation strategies based on cost-
difference but does not take the benefit-difference (i.e. level of risk reduction)
between strategies into consideration.
Effective decision-making requires a correct risk model incorporating multi-
aspect information on countermeasures and a method to select cost-effective
countermeasure alternatives. The multi-aspect information should contain the
knowledge about the countermeasures themselves, their expenditures and suit-
ability to mitigate risks, as well as the impacts they can have on each other.
The focus of this paper is not on how to obtain this information, but rather
on how to make use of this information to select effective risk countermeasures.
In particular, we propose a systematic approach to integrate such multi-aspect
information to reason and make recommendations regarding cost-effective coun-
termeasure alternatives. We are not aware of other approaches of this kind. Our
approach is sufficiently generic to allow it to be combined with many existing
risk analysis methods. In this paper, we demonstrate this by instantiating our
generic approach in the CORAS method for security risk analysis [16] with con-
crete illustrative examples.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we describe our generic
approach. Next, in Section 3 we exemplify the approach by instantiating it in
the CORAS method. We present related work studies in Section 4. Finally, we
summarise and draw conclusions in Section 5.
2 Our Approach
This section describes our approach aiming at the selection of cost-effective coun-
termeasures for unacceptable risks. Section 2.1 provides an overview of this pro-
cess and a conceptual model on which it builds. In Section 2.2 we describe the
expectations to the risk model resulting from the risk assessment process and
taken as input to our treatment assessment process. Finally, in Section 2.3 to
Section 2.5 we describe its three main steps in further detail.
2.1 Process Overview
As illustrated in Fig. 1, our approach takes a risk model resulting from a risk
assessment and the associated risk acceptance criteria as input and delivers a
set of recommended countermeasure alternatives as output. Hence, the approach
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Fig. 2. Conceptual model.
assumes that risk assessment has already been conducted, i.e. that risks have
been identified, estimated and evaluated and that the overall risk analysis process
is ready to proceed with the risk treatment phase. We moreover assume that the
risk analysis process complies with the ISO 31000 risk management standard [13],
in which risk countermeasure is the final phase. Our process consists of three
main steps as follows:
Step 1 Annotate risk model: Identify and document countermeasures. The re-
sults are documented by annotating the risk model taken as input with
relevant information including the countermeasures, their cost, their reduc-
tion effect (i.e., effect on risk value), as well as possible effect dependencies
(i.e., countervailing effects among countermeasures).
Step 2 Perform countermeasure analysis: Enumerate all countermeasure alter-
natives and reevaluate the risk picture for each alternative. The analysis
makes use of the annotated risk model and a calculus for propagating and
aggregating the reduction effect and effect dependency along the risk paths.
Step 3 Perform synergy analysis: Perform synergy analysis for selected risks
based on decision diagrams. The outcome is recommended countermeasure
alternatives which cost-effectively mitigates the selected risks.
Fig. 2 presents the conceptual model, expressed as a UML class diagram [23]
on which our approach builds. A Risk Model is a structured way of represent-
ing an unwanted incident and its causes and consequences using graphs, trees
or block diagrams [22], or tables [16]. An unwanted incident is an event that
harms or reduces the value of an asset, and a risk is the likelihood of an un-
wanted incident and its consequence for a specific asset [13]. A Countermeasure
mitigates risk by reducing its likelihood and/or consequence. The Expenditure
includes the expenditure of countermeasure implementation, maintenance and
so on. The Reduction Effect captures the extent to which a countermeasure mit-
igates risks. The Reduction Effect could be the reduction of likelihood, and/or
the reduction of consequence of a risk. The Effect Dependency captures the
countervailing effect among countermeasures that must be taken into account
in order to understand the combined effect of identified countermeasures. The
Calculus provides a mechanism to reason about the annotated risk model. Using
the Calculus, we can perform countermeasure analysis on annotated risk models
to calculate the residual risk value for each individual risk. A Decision Diagram
facilitates the decision making process based on the countermeasure analysis.
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2.2 Input Assumptions
The input of our approach is a risk model generated by a risk assessment, and
risk acceptance criteria. To ensure that our approach is compatible with several
risk modeling techniques, we expect the risk model could be understood as a
risk graph instantiation. A risk graph [6] is a common abstraction of several
established risk modeling techniques such as fault tree analysis (FTA) [11], event
tree analysis (ETA) [12], attack trees [24], cause-consequence diagrams [17, 22],
Bayesian networks [9], and CORAS risk diagrams [16]. Hence, our approach
complies with these risk modeling techniques, and can be instantiated by them.
A risk graph is a finite set of vertices and relations (see Fig. 3). Each vertex
v represents a threat scenario, i.e. a sequence of events that may lead to an
unwanted incident, and can be assigned a probability p, and a consequence co.
A leads-to relation from v1 to v2 means that the former threat scenario may
lead to the latter. Probabilities on the relations are conditional probabilities
indicating the likelihood of the former to lead to the latter when the former
occurs.
2.3 Detailing of Step 1 – Annotate Risk Model
This step annotates the input risk model with required information for further
analysis. There are four types of annotation as follows:
Countermeasure: In risk graphs, countermeasures are represented as rectan-
gles. In Fig. 4 there is one countermeasure and this is named cm.
Expenditure: In risk graphs, expenditure is expressed within square brackets
following the countermeasure name (e in Fig. 4). This is an estimated of the total
amount of money spent to ensure the mitigation of countermeasure including
expenditure of implementation, deployment, maintenance, and so on.
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Reduction effect: In risk graphs, reduction effect is represented by a dashed
arrow decorated by two numbers (pr and cr in Fig. 4). It captures the miti-
gating effect of a countermeasure in terms of reduced likelihood (i.e. probability
reduction - pr), reduced consequence (i.e. consequence reduction - cr), or both.
Both pr and cr are relative percentage values, i.e. pr, cr ∈ [0, 1].
Effect dependency: In risk graphs, effect dependency is represented by a dash-
dot arrow with solid arrowhead decorated by two numbers (effect on probability
reduction (epr), and effect on consequence reduction (ecr) in Fig. 5). It captures
the impact of a countermeasure to the reduction effect of another, i.e. it can
increase or decrease pr and/or cr of another countermeasure. The epr impacts
pr while the ecr impacts cr. Both epr and ecr are relative percentage values,
i.e. epr, ecr ∈ [0, 1].
2.4 Detailing of Step 2 – Countermeasure Analysis
The countermeasure analysis in this step is conducted for every individual risk of
the annotated risk model. The analysis enumerates all possible countermeasure
combinations, called countermeasure alternatives (or alternatives for short) and
evaluates the residual risk value (i.e. residual consequence and probability) with
resect to each alternative to determine the most efficient one. Residual risk value
is obtained by propagating the reduction effect along the risk model to get
the revised risk values. To this purpose, we have developed a calculus with
propagation rules. An example of rule is shown as below.
Rule 2.1 (Countermeasure) If there is a treats relation from countermeasure
cm to vertex v(p, co) with probability reduction pr and consequence reduction
cr, we have:
cm
pr,cr−−−→ v v(p, co)
v(p · pr, co · cr)
Rule 2.1 applies to countermeasures as depicted in Fig. 4. The probability reduc-
tion pr on the probability p of the scenario means that p is reduced by pr ∈ [0, 1].
Hence, p is multiplied by pr = 1 − pr. Likewise for the consequence reduction.
The complete list of rules is presented in the Appendix B.
From the leftmost threat scenarios (i.e. scenarios that have only outgoing
leads-to relations), probabilities assigned to threat scenarios are propagated to
the right. During the propagation, probabilities assigned to leads-to relations
and reduction effects of countermeasures are taken into account. Finally, the
propagation stops at the rightmost threat scenarios (i.e. scenarios that have
only incoming leads-to relations). Based on the results from the propagation,
the residual risk value is computed.
Decision Diagram is a directed graph plotted in an X-Y plane for an individ-
ual risk as illustrated in Fig. 6. A node in a decision diagram is a risk state, which
is a risk with a certain alternative applied. A risk state is represented by a triplet:
probability, consequence, and countermeasure alternative. The first two values
are obtained from the propagation on the risk diagram. A risk state is plotted
as a node in the X-Y plane with the probability as the X coordinate, and the
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consequence as the Y coordinate. The countermeasure alternative is annotated
on the path from the initial state S0 where no countermeasure applied.
To construct a decision diagram for a risk v, given C as set of countermea-
sures that can be implemented to mitigate v, we start at the initial state S0.
Then, from an existing state Si, we reach new states by considering one or more
further countermeasures in C. By applying the analysis, we can calculate the
corresponding risk state. Notice that we ignore all states whose residual conse-
quence and probability are both greater than those of S0 since it is useless to
implement such countermeasures.
2.5 Detailing of Step 3 – Synergy Analysis
The aim of the synergy analysis is to recommend a cost-effective countermeasure
alternative for mitigating all risks, namely global countermeasure alternative.
Such recommendation is based on the decision diagrams for the individual risks
(generated in Step 2), and the risk acceptance criteria, and the overall costs
(OC) of global countermeasure alternatives which are calculated as follows:
OC(ca) =
∑
r∈Rca
rc(r) +
∑
cm∈ca
cost(cm) (1)
where ca is a global countermeasure alternative; Rca is the set of risks with
respect to the global countermeasure alternative ca; rc() is a function that yields
the loss (in monetary value) due to the risk taken as argument (based on its
probability and consequence); cost() is a function that yields the expenditure of
the countermeasure taken as argument.
The synergy analysis is decomposed into three following substeps:
Step 3A Identify global countermeasure alternatives: Identify the set of global
countermeasure alternatives CA for which all risks are acceptable with re-
spect to the risk acceptance criteria. Decision diagrams of individual risks
can be exploited for identifying CA.
Step 3B Evaluate global countermeasure alternatives: If no such global coun-
termeasure alternative is identified (CA = ∅), do either of the following:
• Identify new countermeasures and go to Step 1, or
• Adjust the risk acceptance criteria and go to Step 3A
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If some global countermeasure alternatives are identified (CA 6= ∅), select
a global countermeasure alternative ca ∈ CA with the lowest overall cost
OC(ca).
Step 3C Decide cost-effective global countermeasure alternative: If OC(ca) is ac-
ceptable (for the customer company in question) then terminate the analysis.
Otherwise, identify more (cheaper and/or more effective) countermeasures
and go to Step 1.
The above procedure may of course be detailed further based on various
heuristics. For example, in many situations, with respect to Step 3A, if the
global countermeasure alternative ca ∈ CA, then we do not have to consider
other global countermeasure alternative ca′ such that ca′ ⊆ ca. However, we do
not go into these issues here.
3 Exemplification in CORAS
As a demonstration of applicability, this section instantiates the proposed ap-
proach into the CORAS method for security risk analysis [16] and exemplifies
how the resulting extended CORAS method and language can be used to select
cost-efficient risk countermeasures in an example drawn from a case study within
the eHealth domain [21].
The risk model in the CORAS method is captured by so-called risk diagrams.
A risk diagram is a causality graph consisting of potential causes (i.e. threats)
that might (or might not) exploit flaws, weaknesses, or deficiencies (i.e. vulnera-
bilities) causing a series of events (i.e. threat scenarios) to happen, which could
lead to unwanted incidents with certain likelihood and concrete consequence
(i.e. risks) to a particular asset. Threat scenarios and risks are also called core
elements in the risk diagram notation.
In the risk diagram, there are two kinds of relationships with assigned like-
lihoods: initiate and leads-to relations. The former connects a threat to a core
element, and the latter connects a core element to another core element. Like-
lihoods assigned to initiate relations can be either probabilities or frequencies,
whereas, likelihoods assigned to leads-to relations are conditional likelihoods.
Any risk diagram can be understood as an instantiation of a risk graph; such
conversion is formally defined in [6]. In this paper, to save space we adjust the
steps of the generic method such that they work directly with CORAS artifacts.
To make the instantiation more comprehensible, we also present a running ex-
ample that exploits an eHealth scenario proposed by the NESSoS project [19] to
exemplify the resulting extended CORAS method.
3.1 eHealth Running Example: Patient Monitoring
As illustrated in Fig. 7, patients’ behaviors and symptoms are monitored in real-
time. This provides an improved basis for disease diagnoses and tailored therapy
prescription regiments. Patients are equipped with sensors that continuously col-
lect patients data and send these data to a handheld smart device (e.g., smart
8
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Fig. 7. Architectural sketch of Patient Monitoring scenario (from [19, Figure 3.2])
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Fig. 8. Risk diagram of the scenario.
phone). This smart device, in turn, sends the patient data to external eHealth
servers where the patients’ eHealth Records (EHRs) are updated.
The CORAS risk diagram in Fig. 8 presents a partial result from a risk
analysis of the Patient Monitoring scenario [21]. In this risk diagram, network
failure exploits the vulnerability unstable/unreliable network connection to ini-
tiate network connection goes down. Likewise, handheld HW failure exploits the
vulnerability unstable/unreliable handheld HW to initiate handheld goes down.
Both handheld goes down as well as network connection goes down may lead to
the transmission of monitored data is interrupted. This, consequently, may lead
to loss of monitored data which impacts the provisioning of monitoring service.
The rest of the diagram is interpreted in the similar manner.
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We assume in the following that this diagram is a consistent and complete
documentation of risks identified during the risk assessment. We moreover use
frequencies to estimate likelihoods of core elements. Reasoning about frequencies
in the risk and treatment assessment is also supported by our calculus.
3.2 Applying Step 1 – Annotate Risk Model
In this step, we annotate the CORAS risk diagrams according to Step 1 to create
CORAS treatment diagrams. Note that in CORAS, countermeasures are referred
to as treatments.
Network connection 
goes down 
[30:10y]
Network 
failure
Unstable/unreliable network 
connection
Ensure sufficient QoS from 
network provider 
[15000$:10y]
Implement redundant 
network connection 
[5000$:10y]
0.7L
0.3L
30:10y
0.7L
Treatment
Cost of Treatment
Reduction Effect
Effect dependency
Fig. 9. Annotated diagram
Treatment annotation: treatments can apply to most of the elements in a
treatment diagram, including all types of core elements, threats, and vulner-
abilities. Fig. 9 shows an example in which a treatment implement redundant
network connection treats the scenario network connection goes down which was
initiated by network failure by exploiting the vulnerability unstable/unreliable
network connection.
Expenditure annotation: the treatment expenditure, annotated as value inside
the treatment bubble, is the total expenditure spent for a treatment in a period
of time. For instance, in Fig. 9, the expenditure for implementing a redundant
network connection is 5000USD:10y in ten year.
Reduction effect annotation: following Step 1, reduction effect in the CORAS
instantiation is annotated on treats relations as a pair 〈fr, cr〉, where fr, cr are
frequency reduction and consequence reduction, respectively. For example, in
Fig. 9, the frequency of network failure is thirty times in ten years, annotated
as 30:10y. In a CORAS diagram, we suffix the value of fr and cr with the letter
‘L’ and ‘C’, respectively, to distinguish between them. The treatment implement
redundant network connection only reduces the frequency (not consequence) of
unreliable network connection by 0.7 at cost 5000USD:10y. This means the re-
duced frequency is (1− 0.7) · 30:10y = 9:10y.
Effect dependency annotation: in Fig. 9, to mitigate network connection goes
down, we could ensure sufficient Quality-of-Service (QoS) from network provider
with the cost of 15000USD:10y. This, however, reduces the effect of a redundant
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connection. These two treatments are countervailing. Ensuring such QoS will
reduce the reduction effect of a redundant connection by 0.3 as annotated in the
figure.
As summary, Fig. 10 shows the treatment diagram resulting from annotating
the risk diagram in Fig. 8. Note that the likelihood annotations in Fig. 10 are
after the application of the analysis of Step 2, which is explained next.
3.3 Applying Step 2 – Treatment Analysis
The analysis employs an instantiated version of the calculus for risk graphs.
Here, we exemplify the propagation of likelihoods and reductions through an
example taken from the annotated treatment diagram of the eHealth scenario.
Particularly, we show how to do the propagation for risk “Loss of Monitored
Data” (LMD). The result is presented in Fig. 10. For clarity, we use following
acronyms for text in the diagram:
– TDI: “Transmission of monitored Data is Interrupted”
– NCD: “Network Connection goes Down”
– HGD: “Handheld Goes Down”
– NF: “Network Failure”
– HHW: “Handheld HW failure”
– IRN: “Implement Redundant Network connection”
– EQS: “Ensure sufficient QoS from network provider”
– IRH: “Implement Redundant Handheld”
Here we describe the frequency propagated for LMD. First, NF initiates
NCD with frequency 30:10y. The treatment IRN would reduce this frequency
by 0.7L. However, due to the effect dependency of EQS to IRN, the likelihood
reduction of IRN is changed to 0.7L · (1 − 0.3L) ≈ 0.5L. Hence, IRN reduces
the frequency propagated to NCD to 30:10y · (1 − 0.5) = 15:10y. EQS would
reduce the frequency of NCD by 0.7L. So, the frequency propagated to NCD is
15:10y · (1− 0.7) = 4.5:10y. Second, HHW initiates HGD with frequency 10:10y.
This is propagated to HGD. IRH treats HGD with likelihood reduction 0.7L.
Hence, frequency propagated to HGD is 10:10y·(1−0.7) = 3:10y. Since NCD and
HGD are independent and both of them lead-to TDI, the frequency propagated
to TDI is 4.5:10y · 0.8 + 3:10y · 0.9 = 6.3:10y. Finally, the propagated frequency
of LMD is 6.3:10y · 0.8 = 5.04:10y.
Likewise we can calculate the frequencies of the entire diagram. Fig. 10 shows
the complete diagram with frequencies calculated and annotated. Note that in
Fig. 10 we have calculated the likelihoods when all treatments are taken into
account. However, due to the effect dependencies it may be that implementing
all treatments is not the optimal alternative.
Fig. 11 presents decision diagrams of risk LMD and LID (i.e. Loss of Integrity
of monitored Data). The detail result of the countermeasure analysis for risk
LMD is provided in the Appendix A.
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Fig. 10. Annotated treatment diagram with frequencies propagated.
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Fig. 11. Decision diagrams of risks in the eHealth scenario.
3.4 Applying Step 3 – Synergy Analysis
To facilitate the synergy analysis described in Step 3, we define the rc() function
in (1) as follows: rc(r) = co·f , where co is the consequence and f is the frequency
of the risk r. Having decision diagrams for individual risks, the synergy analysis
described in Step 3 is detailed as below.
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Step 3A We identify the set of global treatment alternatives based on the
decision diagrams generated in the previous step and the expenditures of
treatments. For each risk, we select the alleged cost-effective treatment al-
ternatives. In particulary, we choose S3LMD {IRH, IRN} (i.e. state S3
of risk LMD), and S7LMD {IRH, IRN,EQS}; for risk DAS, we choose
S3DAS {USW, IRH}, and S2DAS {IRH}; for risk LID, we choose S3LID {IRH, IRN}
and S2LID {UBA}. We assume all of these alternatives are acceptable with
respect to the acceptance criteria.
Step 3B We calculate the overall cost for each global treatment alternative
using (1). Table 1 reports the overall costs for these alternatives. According
to this table, we select GS1 due to its smallest overall cost.
Step 3C For the sake of simplicity, we assume that customers are satisfied with
the recommendation. Therefore, GS1 will be chosen for implementation.
Table 1. The global treatment alternatives in synergy analysis.
Individual Risk
Global Treatment Alternative LID LMD DAS Overall Cost
GS1{UBA,SCO,IRH,IRN,USW} S3 S3 S3 101740
GS2{UBA,SCO,IRH,IRN,EQS,USW} S3 S7 S3 102340
GS3{UBA,IRH,IRN,USW} S2 S3 S3 104500
GS4{UBA,IRH,IRN,EQS,USW} S2 S7 S3 105100
GS5{UBA,SCO,IRH,IRN} S3 S3 S2 108740
GS6{UBA,SCO,IRH,IRN,EQS} S3 S7 S2 109340
GS7{UBA,IRH,IRN} S2 S3 S2 111500
GS8{UBA,IRH,IRN,EQS} S2 S7 S2 112100
4 Related Work
Mehr and Forbes [18] suggest that “risk management theory needs to merge
with traditional financial theory in order to bring added realism to the decision-
making process”. In line with the suggestion, Cost-benefit analysis (CBA) is
often used with risk management to assess the effectiveness of risk countermea-
sures [2, 5, 25]. Major CBA steps include: a) develop measures to mitigate a
certain problem b) develop measure alternatives c) estimate the impact and cost
of each measure d) compare the benefit and costs for each measure alterna-
tive e) conduct a sensitive analysis of the uncertainty of estimated benefit and
cost f) recommend a cost-effective measure alternative for implementation. Our
approach may be seen as a special case or refinement of this process.
In risk management, decision on different risk mitigation alternatives has
been emphasized in many studies [1,20,26]. The guideline in [26] proposes cost-
benefit analysis to optimally allocate resources and implement cost-effective con-
trols after identifying all possible countermeasures. This encompasses the deter-
mination of the impact of implementing (and not implementing) the mitiga-
tions, and the estimated costs of them. Another guideline [1] provides a semi-
quantitative risk assessment. The probability, impact of risks are put into cate-
gories which are assigned with scores. The differences between the total score for
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all risks before and after any proposed risk reduction strategy relatively show
the efficiency among strategies, and effectiveness of their costs. It also suggests
that the economic costs for baseline risks should be evaluated using one of the
following methods: Cost-Of-Illness, Willingness-To-Pay, Qualified-Adjusted Life
Years, Disability-Adjusted Life Years. However, these methods have not been
designed to assess cost of treatments but rather cost of risks.
Norman [20] advocates the use of Decision Matrix to agree on countermea-
sure alternative. A Decision Matrix is a simple spreadsheet which contains a list
of countermeasures and a list of risks which those countermeasures mitigate. For
each countermeasure there are estimates with respect to cost, effectiveness, and
convenience. The countermeasure effectiveness is measured by metrics contained
within the Sandia Vulnerability Assessment Model. The proposed approach is
however not clearly defined, and all metrics are developed as spreadsheets which
are complicated to implement and follow. Meanwhile, our proposal is graphical
and backed up with a formal definition and reasoning. Butler [7] proposes the
Security Attribute Evaluation Method (SAEM) to evaluate alternative security
designs. It employs a four-step process, namely benefit assessment, threat in-
dex evaluation, coverage assessment, and cost analysis. This approach however
focuses mostly on the consequence of risks rather than cost of countermeasures.
Chapman and Leng [8] describes a decision methodology to measure the eco-
nomic performance of risk mitigation alternatives. The methodology is based on
two kinds of analysis (baseline and sensitivity), four methods of economic eval-
uation, and a cost-accounting framework. The cost is broken down into several
dimensions and types. The advantage is to provide a clear economic justification
among mitigation alternatives. However, it does not differentiate alternatives
based on their suitability to mitigate risks. In other words, the methodology
focuses on the cost-difference aspect but does not take into account the benefit-
difference (in terms of level of risks reduced) among alternatives.
Houmb et al. [10] introduce SecInvest, a security investment support frame-
work which derives a security solution fitness score to compare alternatives and
decide whether to invest or to take the associated risk. SecInvest relies on an
eight-step trade-off analysis which employs existing risk assessment techniques
for risk level. SecInvest scores alternatives with respect to their cost and effect,
trade-off parameters, and investment opportunities. However, this approach does
not provide a systematic way to assess the effects of alternatives on risks, either
not take into account the dependency among countermeasures in an alternative.
There exist studies on Real Options Thinking [3, 14, 15] to articulate and
compare different security solutions in terms of their business value. These so-
lutions however are on the management aspect such as postpone, abandon, or
continue to invest in security. Meanwhile, our alternatives are more focused on
the technical aspect. The output of our approach could be taken as the input
for Real Options Thinking based assessment.
5 Conclusion
We have presented a generic approach to select a cost-effective countermeasure
alternative to mitigate risks. The approach requires input in the form of risk
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models represented as risk graphs. The approach analyses risk countermeasures
with respect to different properties such as the amount of risk mitigation (Re-
duction Effect), how countermeasures affect others (Effect Dependency), and
how much countermeasures cost (Countermeasure Expenditure). We have de-
veloped a set of formal rules extending the existing calculus for risk graphs.
These new rules propagate the likelihoods and consequences along risk graphs
thereby facilitating a quantitative countermeasure analysis on individual risks,
and a synergy analysis on all the risks. The outcome is a list of countermeasure
alternatives quantitatively ranked. These alternatives are represented not only
in tabular format, but also in graphical style (Decision Diagram).
We have exemplified the generic approach by embedding it within the CORAS
method. We extend the CORAS method with our approach in an example of
the eHealth domain to select cost-effective treatments. Notations and rules have
been adapted to comply with CORAS. The example demonstrates that our ap-
proach can work with existing defensive risk analysis methods whose risk models
can be converted to risk graphs.
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Table 2. Analysis for the risk LMD.
The name of each treatment alternative is shown in the first column (Risk State). The Frequency
column is number of occurrences in ten years. Both Frequency and Consequence columns are values
after considering the treatments.
Ensure sufficient QoS from network provider
Implement Redundant Network connection
Implement Redundant Handheld
Risk/Risk State Treatment Frequency Consequence
Risk : Loss of Monitored Data
S0 26.4 5000
S1 • 21.36 5000
S2 • 12.96 5000
S3 • • 7.92 5000
S4 • 12.96 5000
S5 • • 7.92 5000
S6 • • 10.08 5000
S7 • • • 5.04 5000
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1 Formal foundation
In the following we introduce the formal machinery.
1.1 Basics
N and R denote the sets of natural numbers and real numbers, respectively. We
use N0 to denote the set of natural numbers including 0, while R+ denotes the
set of nonnegative real numbers. This means that:
N0
def
= N ∪ {0}, R+ def= {r ∈ R | r ≥ 0}
For any set of elements, we use P(A) to denote the powerset of A.
A tuple is an element of a Cartesian product. We use pij to extract the j th
element of a tuple. Hence, if
(a, a ′) ∈ A×A′
then pi1.(a, a
′) = a and pi2.(a, a ′) = a ′.
2
1.2 Sequences
By A∞, A ω and A ∗ we denote the set of all infinite sequences, the set of all
finite and infinite sequences and the set of all finite sequences over some set of
elements A, respectively. Hence, we have that
A ω = A∞ ∪A ∗
We define the functions
# ∈ A ω → N0 ∪ {∞}, [ ] ∈ A ω × N→ A
to yield the length and the nth element of a sequence. Hence, #s yields the
number of elements in s, and s[n] yields the nth element of s if n ≤ #s.
We also need functions for concatenation and filtering:
_ ∈ A ω ×A ω → A ω, S© ∈ P(A)×A ω → A ω
Concatenating two sequences implies gluing them together. Hence, s1_ s2 de-
notes a sequence of length #s1 + #s2 that equals s1 if s1 is infinite, and is
prefixed by s1 and suffixed by s2, otherwise.
The filtering operator is used to filter away elements. B S© s denotes the
subsequence obtained from s by removing all elements in s that are not in the
set B .
1.3 Timed events
E denotes the set of all events, while the set of all timestamps is defined by
T def= R+
A timed event is an element of
E× T
1.4 Histories
A history is an infinite sequence of timed events that is ordered by time and
progresses beyond any finite point in time. Hence, a history is an element of
H def= { h ∈ (E× T)∞ |
∀n ∈ N : pi2.h[n] ≤ pi2.h[n + 1]
∀ t ∈ T : ∃n ∈ N : pi2.h[n] > t }
The first conjunct requires the timestamp of a timed event to be at least as
great as that of its predecessor. The second conjunct makes sure that time will
always progress beyond any finite point in time. That is, for any timestamp t
and history h there is a timed event in h whose timestamp is greater than t .
We also need a function for truncating histories
| ∈ H× T→ (E× T) ∗
The truncation operator captures the prefix of a history upto and including a
certain point in time. Hence, h|t describes the maximal prefix of h whose timed
events all have timestamps less than or equal to t .
3
1.5 Frequencies
As explained above, we use the nonnegative real numbers to represent time.
The time unit is equal to 1. For simplicity, we assume that all frequencies are
per time unit. The set of frequencies F is therefore defined as follows:
F def= R+
Hence, f ∈ F denotes the frequency of f occurrences per time unit.
2 Risk graphs
2.1 Syntax of risk graph formulas
2.1.1 Risk graphs
A risk graph is a pair of two sets (V ,R) where
V ⊆ P(E)× F, R ⊆ V × R+ ×V
We refer to the elements of V as vertices and to the elements of R as relations.
We use v(f ) to denote a vertex, while v
r−→ v ′ denotes a relation.
2.1.2 Vertex expressions
The set of vertex expressions is the smallest set XV such that
P(E) ⊆ XV , v , v ′ ∈ XV ⇒ v unionsq v ′ ∈ XV ∧ v w v ′ ∈ XV
We need a function
s ∈ XV → P(E)
that for any vertex expression yields its set of events. Formally, s is defined
recursively as follows:
s(v)
def
=

v if v ∈ P(E)
s(v1) ∪ s(v2) if v = v1 unionsq v2
s(v2) if v = v1 w v2
2.1.3 Risk graph formula
A risk graph formula is of one of the following two forms
H ` v(f ), H ` v r−→ v ′
where
• H ∈ P(H) \∅,
• v , v ′ ∈ XV ,
• f ∈ F,
• r ∈ R+.
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2.2 Semantics of risk graph formulas
We use the brackets [[ ]] to extract the semantics of a risk graph formula. If
v ∈ P(E) we define:
[[ H ` v(f ) ]] def=
∀ h ∈ H :
f = limt→∞
#((v×T) S© (h|t ))
t
The semantics of any other risk graph formula is defined recursively as follows:
[[ H ` v1 unionsq v2(f ) ]] def=
∃ f1, f2, f3 ∈ F :
[[ H ` v1(f1) ]]
[[ H ` v2(f2) ]]
[[ H ` s(v1) ∩ s(v2)(f3) ]]
f1 + f2 − f3 ≤ f ≤ f1 + f2
[[ H ` v1 w v2(f ) ]] def=
∃ r ∈ R+; f1, f2 ∈ F :
[[ H ` v1(f1) ]]
[[ H ` v2(f2) ]]
f = f1 · r
f ≤ f2
[[ H ` v1 r−→ v2 ]] def=
∃ f1, f2 ∈ F :
[[ H ` v1(f1) ]]
[[ H ` v2(f2) ]]
f2 ≥ f1 · r
2.3 Calculus of risk graph formulas
The three rules below correspond to rules 13.10, 13.11 and 13.12 in the CORAS
book, respectively. There are some minor differences. In the CORAS book the
real number decorating a leads-to relation is restricted to [0, 1]. The statistical
independence constraint in Rule 13.12 of the CORAS book is not needed.
2.3.1 Rule for leads-to
H ` v1(f ) H ` v1 r−→ v2
H ` v1 w v2(f · r)
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Soundness Assume
(1) H ` v1(f )
(2) H ` v1 r−→ v2
Then
(3) H ` (v1 w v2)(f · r)
Proof: (2) implies there are f1, f2 ∈ F such that
(4) [[ H ` v1(f1) ]]
(5) [[ H ` v2(f2) ]]
(6) f2 ≥ f1 · r
(1) and (4) imply
(7) f = f1
(6) and (7) imply
(8) f2 ≥ f · r
(4), (5) and (8) imply (3).
2.3.2 Rule for mutually exclusive vertices
H1 ` v1(f ) ∧ v2(0) H2 ` v2(f ) ∧ v1(0)
H1 ∪H2 ` v1 unionsq v2(f )
For simplicity we have merged four premises into two using logical conjunction.
Soundness Assume
(1) H1 ` v1(f ) ∧ v2(0)
(2) H2 ` v2(f ) ∧ v1(0)
Then
(3) H1 ∪H2 ` v1 unionsq v2(f )
Proof: (1) and (2) imply
(4) H1 ∩H2 = ∅ ∨ f = 0
(1) and (2) imply
(5) H1 ` v1 unionsq v2(f )
(6) H2 ` v1 unionsq v2(f )
(4), (5) and (6) imply (3).
6
2.3.3 Rule for separate vertices
H ` v1(f1) H ` v2(f2) s(v1) ∩ s(v2) = ∅
H ` v1 unionsq v2(f1 + f2)
Soundness Assume
(1) H ` v1(f1)
(2) H ` v2(f2)
(3) s(v1) ∩ s(v2) = ∅
Then
(4) H ` v1 unionsq v2(f1 + f2)
Proof: (3) implies
(5) H ` s(v1) ∩ s(v2)(0)
(1), (2), (5) and the fact that f1 + f2 − 0 ≤ f1 + f2 ≤ f1 + f2 imply (4).
3 Introducing countermeasures
3.1 Formal foundation extended with countermeasures
We start by extending the basic formal machinery to take countermeasures into
consideration.
3.1.1 Timed events with countermeasures
C denotes the set of all countermeasures. To record treatments each timed
event is extended with a possibly empty set of countermeasures. A timed event
with an empty set of countermeasures is untreated, while a timed event with
a nonempty set is treated by the countermeasures in the set. Hence, a timed
event is from this point onwards an element of
E× T× P(C)
3.1.2 Histories with countermeasures
The notion of history is generalised straightforwardly to deal with timed events
with countermeasures as follows:
H def= { h ∈ (E× T× P(C))∞ |
∀n ∈ N : pi2.h[n] ≤ pi2.h[n + 1]
∀ t ∈ T : ∃n ∈ N : pi2.h[n] > t }
The truncation operator
| ∈ H× T→ (E× T× P(C)) ∗
is generalised accordingly.
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3.2 Syntax extended with countermeasures
The next step is to generalize the notion of risk graph.
3.2.1 Risk graphs
A risk graph with treatments is a tuple of five sets (V ,C ,Rl ,Re ,Rd) where
V ⊆ P(E)× F,
C ⊆ C,
Rl ⊆ V × R+ ×V ,
Re ⊆ C × [0, 1]×V ,
Rd ⊆ C × [0, 1]× Re
We refer to the elements of V as the set of vertices, C as the set of counter-
measures, and to Rl ,Re ,Rd as the leads-to relations, the effects relations and
the dependency relations, respectively.
We use v(f ) to denote a vertex, c to denote a countermeasure,
l−→ to denote a
leads-to relation,
e−→ to denote an effects relation and d−→ to denote a dependency
relation.
3.2.2 Vertex expressions
The set of vertex expressions is the smallest set XV such that
v ∈ P(E) ∧ cs ∈ P(C)⇒ vcs ∈ XV
v , v ′ ∈ XV ⇒ v unionsq v ′ ∈ XV ∧ v w v ′ ∈ XV
We need a function
s ∈ XV → P(E)
that for any vertex expression calculates its set of events. Formally, s is defined
recursively as follows:
s(v)
def
=

v ′ if v = v ′cs
s(v1) ∪ s(v2) if v = v1 unionsq v2
s(v2) if v = v1 w v2
3.2.3 Risk graph formula
A risk graph formula is of one of the following four forms
H ` c e−→cs v , H ` c d−→ (c′ e−→cs v), H ` v ′(f ), H ` v ′ r−→ v ′′
where
• H ∈ P(H),
• c, c′ ∈ C where c 6= c′,
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• e, d ∈ [0, 1],
• cs ∈ P(C) where c, c′ 6∈ cs,
• v ∈ P(E),
• v ′, v ′′ ∈ XV ,
• f ∈ F,
• r ∈ R+.
3.3 Semantics extended with countermeasures
The semantics of a risk graph formula is defined recursively as before. In par-
ticular, the definitions are unchanged in the case of
[[ H ` v1 unionsq v2(f ) ]], [[ H ` v1 w v2(f ) ]], [[ H ` v1 r−→ v2 ]]
The vertex base-case must however be updated to take countermeasures into
account:
[[ H ` vcs(f ) ]] def=
∀ h ∈ H :
f = limt→∞
#((v×T×P(C\cs)) S© (h|t ))
t
Hence, we only take into consideration those events in v that are not treated by
a countermeasure in cs.
In the case of the effects relation the semantics is defined as follows:
[[ H ` c e−→cs v ]] def=
∃ f1, f2 ∈ F :
[[ H ` vcs(f1) ]]
[[ H ` vcs∪{c}(f2) ]]
f1 6= 0⇒ e = f1−f2f1
Hence, e is the fraction of v events whose set of countermeasures contains c but
no countermeasure in cs.
Also the dependency relation captures a fraction:
[[ H ` c d−→ (c′ e−→cs v) ]] def=
[[ H ` c′ e−→cs v ]]⇒
∃ e ′ ∈ [0, 1] :
[[ H ` c′ e
′
−→cs∪{c} v ]]
e 6= 0⇒ d = 1− e′e
Hence, d is the fraction of v treated by countermeasure c′ that is also treated
by countermeasure c.
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3.4 Calculus extended with countermeasures
3.4.1 Rule for countermeasure effect
H ` c e−→cs v H ` vcs(f )
H ` vcs∪{c}(f · e)
Soundness Assume
(1) H ` c e−→cs v
(2) H ` vcs(f )
Then
(3) H ` vcs∪{c}(f · e)
Proof: (1) implies there are f1, f2 ∈ F such that
(4) [[ H ` vcs(f1) ]]
(5) [[ H ` vcs∪{c}(f2) ]]
(6) f1 6= 0⇒ e = f1−f2f1
(2) and (4) imply
(7) f = f1
There are two cases to consider:
• Assume
(8) f1 = 0
(4) and (7) imply
(9) [[ H ` vcs∪{c}(0) ]]
(7) and (8) imply
(10) f = 0
(9), (10) and 0 · e = 0 imply (3).
• Assume
(11) f1 6= 0
(6), (7) and (11) imply
(12) e = f−f2f
(12) implies
(13) f2f = 1− e
(13) implies
(14) f2 = f · e
(5) and (14) imply (3).
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3.4.2 Rule for countermeasure dependency
H ` c d−→ (c′ e−→cs v) H ` c′ e−→cs v
H ` c′ e·d−−→cs∪{c} v
Soundness Assume
(1) H ` c d−→ (c′ e−→cs v)
(2) H ` c′ e−→cs v
Then
(3) H ` c′ e·d−−→cs∪{c} v
Proof: There are two cases to consider:
• Assume
(4) e 6= 0
(1), (2) and (4) imply there is e ′ ∈ [0, 1] such that
(5) [[ H ` c′ e
′
−→cs∪{c} v ]]
(6) d = 1− e′e
(6) implies
(7) e
′
e = 1− d = d
(5) and (7) imply (3).
• Assume
(8) e = 0
(2), (8) and the semantics of the effects relation imply (3).
4 Introducing consequences
4.1 Formal foundation extended with consequences
We start by extending the basic formal machinery to take consequences into
consideration.
4.1.1 Timed events with consequences
I denotes the set of all consequences (or impacts). To facilitate arithmetic
operations on consequences we assume that
I def= R+
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To record consequences each timed event is extended with an additional com-
ponent characterizing the consequence of this event with respect to the various
combinations of countermeasures. A timed event is from this point onwards an
element of
E× T× P(C)× (P(C)→ I)
For any timed event e we require
c ⊆ c′ ⇒ (pi4.e)(c) ≥ (pi4.e)(c′)
Hence, adding a countermeasure will never increase the consequence.
4.1.2 Histories with consequences
The notion of history is generalised straightforwardly to deal with consequences
as follows:
H def= { h ∈ (E× T× P(C)× (P(C)→ I))∞ |
∀n ∈ N : pi2.h[n] ≤ pi2.h[n + 1]
∀ t ∈ T : ∃n ∈ N : pi2.h[n] > t }
The truncation operator
| ∈ H× T→ (E× T× P(C)× (P(C)→ I)) ∗
is generalised accordingly.
4.2 Syntax extended with consequences
The next step is to generalize the notion of risk graph.
4.2.1 Risk graphs
The notion of risk graph is a tuple of five sets (V ,C ,Rl ,Re ,Rd) where
V ⊆ P(E)× F× I,
C ⊆ C,
Rl ⊆ V × R+ ×V ,
Re ⊆ C × [0, 1]× [0, 1]×V ,
Rd ⊆ C × [0, 1]× [0, 1]× Re
We use v(f , i) to denote a vertex,
(ef ,ei )−−−−→ to denote an effects relation and (df ,di )−−−−→
to denote a dependency relation. The remaining conventions are as before.
4.2.2 Vertex expressions
The notion of vertex expression is left unchanged.
12
4.2.3 Risk graph formula
A risk graph formula is of one of the following four forms
H ` c (ef ,ei )−−−−→cs v , H ` c (df ,di )−−−−→ (c′ (ef ,ei )−−−−→cs v), H ` v ′(f , i), H ` v ′ r−→ v ′′
where
• H ∈ P(H),
• c, c′ ∈ C where c 6= c′,
• ef , ei , df , di ∈ [0, 1],
• cs ∈ P(C) where c, c′ 6∈ cs,
• v ∈ P(E),
• v ′, v ′′ ∈ XV ,
• f ∈ F,
• i ∈ I,
• r ∈ R+.
4.3 Semantics extended with consequences
[[ H ` vcs(f , i) ]] def=
∀ h ∈ H :
let
x = (v × T× P(C \ cs)× (P(C)→ I)) S© h
in
#x = 0⇒
f = 0
i = 0
#x 6= 0⇒
f = limt→∞
#(x |t )
t
i = limt→∞
∑
1≤j≤#(x|t ) pi4.x [j ](cs)
#(x |t )
[[ H ` v1 unionsq v2(f , i) ]] def=
∃ f1, f2, f3 ∈ F :
[[ H ` v1(f1, i) ]]
[[ H ` v2(f2, i) ]]
[[ H ` s(v1) ∩ s(v2)(f3, i) ]]
f1 + f2 − f3 ≤ f ≤ f1 + f2
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[[ H ` v1 w v2(f , i) ]] def=
∃ r ∈ R+; f1, f2 ∈ F; i ′ ∈ I :
[[ H ` v1(f1, i ′) ]]
[[ H ` v2(f2, i) ]]
f = f1 · r
f ≤ f2
[[ H ` v1 r−→ v2 ]] def=
∃ f1, f2 ∈ F; i1, i2 ∈ I :
[[ H ` v1(f1, i1) ]]
[[ H ` v2(f2, i2) ]]
f2 ≥ f1 · r
[[ H ` c (ef ,ei )−−−−→cs v ]] def=
∃ f1, f2 ∈ F; i1, i2 ∈ I :
[[ H ` vcs(f1, i1) ]]
[[ H ` vcs∪{c}(f2, i2) ]]
f1 6= 0⇒ ef = f1−f2f1
i1 6= 0⇒ ei = i1−i2i1
[[ H ` c (df ,di )−−−−→ (c′ (ef ,ei )−−−−→cs v) ]] def=
[[ H ` c′ (ef ,ei )−−−−→cs v ]]⇒
∃ e ′f , e ′i ∈ [0, 1] :
[[ H ` c′ (e
′
f ,e
′
i )−−−−→cs∪{c} v ]]
ef 6= 0⇒ df = 1− e
′
f
ef
ei 6= 0⇒ di = 1− e
′
i
ei
4.4 Calculus extended with consqeuences
4.4.1 Rule for leads-to
H ` v1(f1, i1) H ` v1 r−→ v2 H ` v2(f2, i2)
H ` v1 w v2(f1 · r , i2)
Soundness We need an additional premise to conclude that i2 is the impact
of v2. Except for that the introduction of consequences is irrelevant for the
validity of the rule. Hence, the soundness follows from the soundness of Rule
2.3.1.
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4.4.2 Rule for mutually exclusive vertices
H1 ` v1(f , i) ∧ v2(0, i) H2 ` v2(f , i) ∧ v1(0, i)
H1 ∪H2 ` v1 unionsq v2(f , i)
Soundness The introduction of consequences is irrelevant for the validity of
the rule. Hence, the soundness follows from the soundness of Rule 2.3.2.
4.4.3 Rule for separate vertices
H ` v1(f1, i) H ` v2(f2, i) s(v1) ∩ s(v2) = ∅
H ` v1 unionsq v2(f1 + f2, i)
Soundness The introduction of consequences is irrelevant for the validity of
the rule. Hence, the soundness follows from the soundness of Rule 2.3.3.
4.4.4 Rule for countermeasure effect
H ` c (ef ,ei )−−−−→cs v H ` vcs(f , i)
H ` vcs∪{c}(f · ef , i · ei)
Soundness Assume
(1) H ` c (ef ,ei )−−−−→cs v
(2) H ` vcs(f , i)
Then
(3) H ` vcs∪{c}(f · ef , i · ei)
Proof: The soundness of the frequency deduction follows from the soundness
of Rule 3.4.1. Hence, we focus only on the consequence deduction. (1) implies
there are f1, f2 ∈ F and i1, i2 ∈ I such that
(4) [[ H ` vcs(f1, i1) ]]
(5) [[ H ` vcs∪{c}(f2, i2) ]]
(6) i1 6= 0⇒ ei = i1−i2i1
(2) and (4) imply
(7) i = i1
There are two cases to consider:
• Assume
(8) i1 = 0
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(4), (5) and (7) imply
(9) [[ H ` vcs∪{c}(f2, 0) ]]
(7) and (8) imply
(10) i = 0
(9), (10) and 0 · ei = 0 imply (3).
• Assume
(11) i1 6= 0
(6), (7) and (11) imply
(12) ei =
i−i2
i
(12) implies
(13) i2i = 1− ei
(13) implies
(14) i2 = i · ei
(5) and (14) imply (3).
4.4.5 Rule for countermeasure dependency
H ` c (df ,di )−−−−→ (c′ (ef ,ei )−−−−→cs v) H ` c′ (ef ,ei )−−−−→cs v
H ` c′ (ef ·df ,ei ·di )−−−−−−−→cs∪{c} v
Soundness Assume
(1) H ` c (df ,di )−−−−→ (c′ (ef ,ei )−−−−→cs v)
(2) H ` c′ (ef ,ei )−−−−→cs v
Then
(3) H ` c′ (ef ·df ,ei ·di )−−−−−−−→cs∪{c} v
Proof: The soundness of the frequency deduction follows from the soundness of
Rule 4.4.5. Hence, we focus only on the consequence deduction. There are two
cases to consider:
• Assume
(4) ei 6= 0
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(1), (2) and (4) imply there are e ′f , e
′
i ∈ [0, 1] such that
(5) [[ H ` c′ (e
′
f ,e
′
i )−−−−→cs∪{c} v ]]
(6) di = 1− e
′
i
ei
(6) implies
(7)
e′i
ei
= 1− di = di
(5) and (7) imply (3).
• Assume
(8) ei = 0
(2), (8) and the constraint that adding a countermeasure will never in-
crease the consequence imply (3).
5 Introducing intervals
5.1 Syntax extended with intervals
The syntax is as before with the exception that we now have intervals
where we earlier had singular values.
5.2 Semantics extended with intervals
The semantics is generalised to intervals in a point-wise manner:
[[ H ` vcs(F , I ) ]] def=
∀ h ∈ H ; ∃ f ∈ F ; i ∈ I :
[[ {h} ` vcs(f , i) ]]
[[ H ` v1 unionsq v2(F , I ) ]] def=
∀ h ∈ H ; ∃ f ∈ F ; i ∈ I :
[[ {h} ` v1 unionsq v2(f , i) ]]
[[ H ` v1 w v2(F , I ) ]] def=
∀ h ∈ H ; ∃ f ∈ F ; i ∈ I :
[[ {h} ` v1 unionsq v2(f , i) ]]
[[ H ` v1 R−→ v2 ]] def=
∀ h ∈ H ; ∃ r ∈ R :
[[ {h} ` v1 r−→ v2 ]]
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[[ H ` c (EF ,EI )−−−−−→cs v ]] def=
∀ h ∈ H ; ∃ ef ∈ EF , ei ∈ EI :
[[ {h} ` c (ef ,ei )−−−−→cs v ]]
[[ H ` c (DF ,DI )−−−−−→ (c′ (EF ,EI )−−−−−→cs v) ]] def=
∀ h ∈ H ; ∃ df ∈ DF ; di ∈ DI ; ef ∈ EF ; ei ∈ EI :
[[ {h} ` c (df ,di )−−−−→ (c′ (ef ,ei )−−−−→cs v) ]]
5.3 Calculus extended with intervals
5.3.1 Rule for leads-to
H ` v1(F1, I1) H ` v1 R−→ v2 H ` v2(F2, I2)
H ` v1 w v2(F1 · R, I2)
Soundness By pointwise application of Rule 4.4.1.
5.3.2 Rule for mutually exclusive vertices
H1 ` v1(F , I ) ∧ v2({0}, I ) H2 ` v2(F , I ) ∧ v1({0}, I )
H1 ∪H2 ` v1 unionsq v2(F , I )
Soundness By pointwise application of Rule 4.4.2.
5.3.3 Rule for separate vertices
H ` v1(F1, I ) H ` v2(F2, I ) s(v1) ∩ s(v2) = ∅
H ` v1 unionsq v2(F1 + F2, I )
Soundness By pointwise application of Rule 4.4.3.
5.3.4 Rule for countermeasure effect
H ` c (EF ,EI )−−−−−→cs v H ` vcs(F , I )
H ` vcs∪{c}(F · EF , I · EI )
Soundness By pointwise application of Rule 4.4.4.
5.3.5 Rule for countermeasure dependency
H ` c (DF ,DI )−−−−−→ (c′ (EF ,EI )−−−−−→cs v) H ` c′ (EF ,EI )−−−−−→cs v
H ` c′ (EF ·DF ,EI ·DI )−−−−−−−−−−→cs∪{c} v
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Soundness By pointwise application of Rule 4.4.5.
5.3.6 Rule for arbitrary vertices
H ` v1(F1, I ) H ` v2(F2, I )
H ` v1 unionsq v2([max({min(F1),min(F2)}),max(F1) + max(F2)], I )
Soundness The upper bound corresponds to the case where the set of
events of the two vertices in a history are disjoint, while the lower bound
corresponds to the case where the set of events in a history belonging to
one of the vertices is fully contained in the history’s set of events belonging
to the other vertex.
6 Relating CORAS to Risk Graphs
We distinguish between two kinds of CORAS elements, namely the set
EUI of unwanted elements, and the set ETS of scenario elements. We
assume that
EUI ∩ ETS = ∅
We refer to the sequences in ETS ∗ as the threat scenarios elements. An
unwanted incident in CORAS may be thought of as a set of unwanted
elements, while a threat scenario corresponds to a set of threat scenario
elements.
A timed CORAS event is a quadruple of the following type
(EUI ∪ ETS ∗)× T× P(C)× (P(C)→ I)
While an unwanted incident element is instantanious a threat scenario
element is not. The timestamp of a threat scenario element denotes its
time of termination. In CORAS only unwanted incidents may have a
consequence. Hence, in the case of threat scenario elements, any set of
countermeasures is mapped to 0.
The relationship between a timed CORAS event and a timed risk graph
even is defined by a function map such that
map(e, t , co, im)
def
= (m(e), t , co, im)
where
m ∈ EUI ∪ ETS ∗ → E
is a bijective function. This means that
m(e) = m(e ′)⇒ e = e ′
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